



SAHEL-SAHARA DIALOGUE REPORT 3RD EDITION

Prospects for sustainable peace in the Sahel: What inclusive responses to security instability in the Sahel-Saharan and West Africa?

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Abbreviations

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| ACLED | Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project |
| CHEDS | Centre des Hautes Etudes de Défense et de Sécurité (Centre for Higher Defence and Security Studies) |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| ECPF | ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework |
| F.O.R.C.-G | Fédération des Organisations de Résistance Civile de Gao (Federation of Civil Resistance Organisations of Gao) |
| FAO | United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation |
| FC-G55 | G5 Sahel Joint Force |
| FES PSCC | Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Peace and Security Centre of Competence Sub-Saharan Africa |
| ISGS | Islamic State in the Greater Sahara |
| MINUSMA | United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali |
| MNJTF | Multinational Joint Task Force |
| SALW | Small arms and light weapons |
| TFPs | Technical and Financial Partners |
| VDP | Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie (Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland) |
| WFP | World Food Programme |
| WPS | Women, Peace and Security component |



Background

For years, the countries of the Sahel-Saharan region and West Africa have been grappling with a succession of political, humanitarian and security crises with negative impacts on peace and development. The threats of destabilisation in this region notably include a broad spectrum of economic and social factors (poverty and inequalities), unfulfilled constitutional and political reforms, conflicts over access to and exploitation of natural resources that are depleted due to climate change, and inter-community tensions. In addition to these structuring factors, there is the weakness of democratic institutions and defence and security forces, which sometimes play a dysfunctional role; a weakened civil society; the lack of transparency of the elites who benefit from deficient legitimacy; and the fact that the majority of the population do not receive 'peace dividends'. Insecurity is also fuelled by the presence of radical Islamist groups and cross-border crime, which is facilitated by the vast size of national territories, the porous nature of the borders, the limited capacities of national governments in the region, the illegal circulation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and, above all, the absence of clear strategies at national level. The typology of these destabilising security challenges and threats, as well as their transnational nature and rapid regional spread call for an integrated response from the countries of West Africa and the Sahel.

Despite the major efforts made, it must be acknowledged that the solutions proposed thus far remain insufficient or even ineffective. This has been evidenced by the frequent extremist and criminal attacks and the resurgence of coups d'état (Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Chad), which led the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, to recognise the situation before the United Nations Security Council in January 2018. Similarly, the inconsistencies between the approaches taken by international partners have caused misunderstandings, limiting their effectiveness and undermining the will to collectively resolve common security challenges. Coordinated and collective approaches that address the root causes of the current crises in the region are urgently needed to effectively respond to its dynamic and hybrid security threats. In the Sahel-Sahara and West Africa, the challenge truly lies in the communitarisation of security, that is, the ability to address security collectively. It is important to act flexibly and inclusively and to obtain the support of governments and the population. National governments are therefore called upon to coordinate their actions and policies to combat the criminal and terrorist groups that use their territories as a refuge, taking advantage of the fragility of their institutions. This will mean integrating national security policies into a comprehensive Sahel-Saharan security and defence policy to promote better collective security in response to security challenges.

Introduction

The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Peace and Security Competence Centre Sub-Saharan Africa (FES PSCC) organised the third edition of the Sahel-Sahara Dialogue regional conference in Dakar from Thursday, 31 March to Friday, 1 April 2022, on the subject of *'Prospects for Sustainable Peace in the Sahel: What Inclusive Responses to Security Instability in the Sahel-Sahara and West Africa?'*.

The prevailing environment in the Sahel-Saharan and West African countries, characterized by political, humanitarian, security, and environmental crises, stems from a combination of institutional, governmental, socio-political, and economic factors, among others. For more than a decade, the region has experienced:

- constitutional and political reforms that are at odds with the will of the people, leading to violent repression,
- the proliferation of radical Islamist groups taking advantage of porous borders, poorly equipped armies, and the sheer size of national territories to gain a foothold and commit acts of violence,
- the development of cross-border crime,
- the depletion of natural resources under the combined impact of demographic pressures and climate change, in addition to the lack of transparency surrounding their exploitation,
- a civil society weakened and combated by the authoritarian regimes in power and terrorized by certain armed groups,
- the persistence of extremist and criminal attacks with their tragic toll on civilians and military personnel, which rises on a daily basis,
- the resurgence of coups d'état (Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Chad) and inconsistent approaches by international partners have caused misunderstandings, as well as
- inconsistencies and inefficiencies in the approaches and solutions adopted thus far.

In response to this situation, the third edition of the Sahel-Sahara Dialogue has adopted an approach based on reflection and innovative proposals to reverse these trends and strengthen collective security in this part of the continent.



I. Opening ceremony

The opening ceremony was marked by the presence of the Director of the FES PSCC, the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to Senegal, and the Director of the Centre for Higher Defence and Security Studies (CHEDS).

The Director of the FES PSCC began by extending his greetings and thanks to the participants. Following this, H.E. the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany delivered the opening speech of the conference, stressing the deterioration of the situation in the Sahel despite

multiple interventions by various partners. In his view, the situation was worsening due to the war in Ukraine, which had created a risk of increased food insecurity. The alert issued by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) on the probable rise in the number of famine victims in the Sahel and higher prices for cereals such as wheat and maize, which are chiefly imported from Russia and Ukraine, showed that these shocks threatened to have a lasting impact on the Sahel on the heels of the COVID-19 crisis.

II. Conference proceedings

Introductory Brief

At the opening of the first day's panels, the introductory brief highlighted the need to reconsider resilience and conflict resolution on the continent, both generally and more specifically in West Africa and the Sahel. The focus should be more on permanent conflict resolution and not just on conflict settlement. For this to be achieved, responses must take into account the specificities of the Sahel-Sahara zone and West Africa. The importance of reviewing the multiplicity of institutional cooperation frameworks between the countries of these zones was also cited, as this situation runs the risk of weakening institutional decisions, as well as alternating economic solutions and detachment of economic and political institutions.

Thus, emphasis should be placed on:

- African ownership or 'Africanisation' of concepts and the urgent need for Africa

to establish mechanisms for the inclusion of traditional systems in conflict resolution by creating an appropriate framework to prevent their corruption or politicisation,

- Restoring trust between the people and political leaders, and
- The need to educate and train people on the principles of democracy through a culture that strengthens and boosts political dialogue.

In other words, Africa must resolve its conflicts by drawing on its endogenous knowledge and practices. This will imply stronger ownership of the concepts used by the partners to describe the current situation on the continent.

In accordance with the conference agenda, all panels were conducted in the form of presentations by stakeholders, experts, researchers, and specialists from the Sahel. The presentations were followed by discussions among the panelists under the guidance of the moderators.



Panel 01:

Analysis of the socio-political and security dynamics in the Sahel and their impact on the stability of the region

Despite the strong commitment and significant investment of international partners and national governments in the region, the situation in the Sahel has continued to deteriorate over the years. Civilians are the primary victims of the violence perpetrated with total impunity by a variety of actors (groups identified as jihadists, self-defence militias, criminal groups, and members of national and regional defence and security forces). According to ACLED data, in the past two years (2020-2022), nearly 2,500 civilians have been killed in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger alone, and millions of people have had to flee their homes due to violence in these three central Sahel countries. In addition to the many challenges facing Sahelian countries, there has also been the COVID-19 pandemic and the resurgence of coups in the region.

The panel pointed out that the Sahel was facing numerous challenges, including population displacement, the breakdown of the education system in several conflict regions, the persistence of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the resurgence of coups in the region. The multidimensional nature of the crisis was also highlighted.

- First and foremost, it is a security crisis, as demonstrated by the violence committed by various actors, and the smuggling operations run by armed groups that contribute to their financing. In this respect, the security crisis is not only exacerbated by the struggle for control of increasingly scarce natural resources; it is above all the reflection of an institutional failure. The crisis reflects the weakness, if not the failure, of national governments, which have difficulty meeting the basic needs of

the population, let alone ensuring control over large swathes of their territory which remain under the occupation of various armed groups. The size of the national territories and the porous nature of their borders have accentuated feelings of insecurity and helped it spread, prompting one of the participants to say that *'crisis and insecurity in one country often spell danger in the neighbouring countries'*. The spread of the crisis is particularly beneficial to criminal networks and drug traffickers. The crisis can also be described as a social crisis, to the extent that the social contract between the leadership and the people has been broken. As a result, the people have lost faith in the political elites, who regard government as a source of revenue, leading to the failure of political and social governance. The national governments do not seem to be able to respond to the basic needs of their citizens. The disconnect between governments and citizens is also evidenced in the Sahel and increasingly throughout West Africa by the loss of momentum or outright rejection of the traditional Western partners of policymakers in the region, whose actions and negative social policies are denounced by the people. This is illustrated by the recurring demonstrations of Sahelian and West African youth against France. Some view Russia and China as more reliable and effective partners in the fight against terrorism.

- Finally, the crisis also affects the electoral systems, leading to protests and ultimately to coups d'état. While the Economic Com-

munity of West African States (ECOWAS) focuses on maintaining the electoral calendar, some people seem to be turning their backs on it because they have not felt its impact on their daily lives. In this respect, the crisis in the Sahel could be viewed as a crisis of confidence or even a political and strategic divorce between France and its former colonies and beyond.

- The foregoing is compounded by an environmental crisis stemming from the negative impact of climate change on the region. First of all, the Sahelian way of life generates constant inter-community conflicts between sedentary and nomadic populations. The increase in climate change-related conflicts has led to indiscriminate violence that has forced many thousands of people to flee within the region. Secondly, and as a consequence of the above, the increase in uncontrolled population flows has led to internal displacement and illegal migration to other countries. In a region with porous borders such as the Sahel, where borders are constantly being crossed, this human movement also causes conflicts between indigenous and non-indigenous populations. Thirdly, water shortages, food insecurity and natural disasters are driving a substantial proportion of the rural population into cities, where governments are unable to provide the services that the urban population demands. This context can easily become a source of frustration, especially for young people who see armed groups as a way out of poverty. Thus, the multiple work opportunities offered by trafficking associated with organised crime ends up becoming the only livelihood system. This economic system therefore

becomes a structural element that keeps the Sahel region from emerging from underdevelopment, which is precisely why the border areas are the most heavily affected by violence. Jihadist terrorism operates in these areas for reasons that are not directly related to climate change but are fuelled by other circumstances that it generates. This is the case in the Liptako-Gourma area, between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, where clashes are taking place between members of al-Qaeda and Daesh. It also applies to the Lake Chad region. There, the people have had to move to neighbouring Nigeria, where they suffer from the scourge of the Boko Haram terrorist group.



With regard to security dynamics, the panel noted two facts.

- Firstly, the jihadist insurgency is growing; there is a proliferation of jihadist groups and an increase in their capacity to cause harm, with frequent deadly terrorist attacks on the armed forces and an increase in the number of acts of violence against civilian populations, such as the massacre of Daoussak Tuaregs in Tessit by the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS).
- Secondly, central governments are weak and powerless in the face of rising insecurity: countries have delegated some of their security responsibilities to third parties (mercenaries or militias) such as the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP) in Burkina Faso; self-defence groups

and militias have multiplied and are increasingly violent; and ad-hoc security units have been set up at regional and/or international level such as the G-5.

In the light of the foregoing, the participants agreed that technical and financial partners (TFPs) needed to align their agendas with the policies and priority needs of Sahelian countries. They recalled that it was imperative for African governments to impose their priorities and unite in response to security challenges. Attention was also drawn to the need to involve young people in crisis resolution, both upstream and downstream, through inclusive education and socio-economic development programmes, in order to remove any temptation to answer the call of criminal movements, particularly extremist ones, in the region.

Panel 02:

What cross-border cooperation between Sahelian states to effectively address common security challenges?

There is a long established link between security and cooperation. The transnational nature of security threats in the Sahel should prompt political actors, including national governments and international organisations, to engage in close and continuing regional cooperation and coordination. Changing and increasingly complex geopolitical and security issues call for enhanced regional cooperation. The limited resources available to each country clearly demonstrate the need to build regional cooperation based on an integrated Sahel-Saharan strategy to promote better collective security in the region, as no country can meet these challenges alone. But the question remains:

- How can an intra-Sahel cooperation agenda be established to effectively respond to the security challenges in the region?
- What inclusive approaches and which key actors should be prioritised in the implementation of this type of cooperation?

Considering that no country can deal with the challenges facing the Sahel on its own, it is imperative to build regional cooperation based on an integrated Sahel-Saharan strategy to promote better collective security in the region. With this in mind, the panellists discussed the regional cooperation institutions. The Sahel region is marked by migratory and trade flows, yet since 2016 the international joint task force has been in a state of lethargy, adding to the area's exceptional political instability, with rebellions, jihadist insurgencies, coups d'état, protest movements and illicit trafficking. The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)

is an effort by the Lake Chad Basin countries (Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria) to pool their resources to fight the jihadist menace. The joint task force has carried out operations that have often involved troops from these countries fighting in the others' countries. While they have achieved some victories, the jihadists have rallied. Responsive insurgent factions have been quick to regroup, while the effectiveness of the MNJTF has been undermined by unclear priorities, the reluctance of all four states to hand over the command of operations to the joint force, and delays in funding and supplies. If they are to gain ground and provide additional funding, the four national armies need to cooperate more closely. Responding more effectively to the insurgency around Lake Chad will require more than just the MNJTF; it will also require governments to improve the living conditions of the people in the affected areas and build their confidence. However, a more effective MNJTF could contribute to this strategy. The Lake Chad countries should therefore strengthen their planning, communications, and intelligence-sharing capacities, uphold human rights, and improve military-civilian coordination. They should then seek an understanding with donors on the financing of the task force.

The geographical scope of trafficking and terrorist networks and their cross-border dimension and interlocking nature demonstrate the need to strengthen regional cooperation, restore state legitimacy and develop inclusive local and cross-border governance solutions. To this end, cross-border cooperation should be adapted to the realities on the ground and involve a variety



of actors who are familiar with the day-to-day concerns of border populations. Cross-border territories are areas with high economic potential, but also places where criminal activity flourishes. They therefore require very close attention from policy makers and security officials.

Coming back to security cooperation, the panellists stated that it took place at different levels (information sharing, juxtaposed checkpoints, joint operations, judicial cooperation, etc.). Furthermore, as countries are affected differently by terrorist insecurity and organised crime, cooperation also has limitations, which include:

- differing national priorities,
- protection of national sovereignty and

- defence of strategic interests,
- historical political tensions between the states,
- a lack of funding and strategic autonomy, and
- differences between security cultures, political systems, etc.

To address these challenges, the participants proposed several avenues or approaches to help improve cooperation between Sahelian countries, although they stressed that, ultimately, cooperative action can only bring results if it is based on mutual trust between countries and the full and effective involvement of the populations whose aspirations must be taken into account through consultation mechanisms.

Panel 03:

The need to rethink the security response in the Sahel: what coherent strategies to promote lasting stability in the region?

For several years, priority has been given to military action, through counter-terrorism operations conducted by Sahelian armies, both nationally and within the framework of the FC-G5S, as well as by international troops, first and foremost the French Barkhane force. This approach aims, once security is restored, to enable the reestablishment of the government and to promote development, according to a strategy drawn up at the G-5 Sahel summit held in Pau, France, in January 2020. Investments in the fight against terrorism, with a strong bias towards security spending (up to one fifth of national budgets in Mali and Niger), have often been made at the expense of core social projects. Yet the security response as it has been implemented has not improved the daily lives of the population. On the contrary, it has often led to increased attacks on civilians. Given the persistence of insecurity and instability in the Sahel, the effectiveness of the security-focused strategy needs to be questioned, and more effective and appropriate alternative solutions considered.

This panel focused on the security situation in the Sahel countries. Two key findings emerged:

- the limitations of security interventions under the leadership of external actors such as MINUSMA, Barkhane and Takuba, and
- the rise of social unrest due to the failure of democratically elected authorities to resolve the problem of insecurity.

The situation is particularly alarming in the Liptako-Gourma region, where the porous borders of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso meet. Attacks by violent extremist groups and other armed actors combine with illicit activities, local conflicts, and community violence to further weaken a region that has long suffered from poor governance. Yet, since the security crisis began in Mali in 2012 and spread across the region, particularly in Burkina Faso and Niger, numerous initiatives have been taken, with a strong military focus. Thus, from MINUSMA to FC-G5S to Operation Barkhane, there has been what some have referred to as a 'security traffic jam' in the region. Today, several years after the beginning of the crisis, the security situation remains precarious, and more and more voices are being raised within civil society, not only in the region, to call for the political management of insecurity in the Sahel. The option of dialogue with violent extremist groups, as in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, seems to be part of this approach. It emerged from the discussions that there is a need to strengthen and broaden the options for a peace solution through dialogue. The dialogue option should be considered in its holistic dimension, i.e., taking into account all the variables involved in the security crisis, including the structural factors behind the involvement of certain communities in violent extremist groups. This is particularly important in light of the fact that there are already discussions ongoing with these groups at the level of certain local communities. Dialogue should be viewed holistically. Confining it to a performative, community-based register or to a single rung of the hierarchy (leadership) reinforces imbalances, creates new opportuni-



ties for violence and radicalisation, and limits its impact on the prospects of building genuine peace. Opening up dialogue means agreeing to speak with extremist armed groups in order to increase the chances of assuaging the violence and frustrations that are generated on a daily basis. Moreover, broadening the scope of the dialogue to different levels makes it possible to build bridges between conflict levels, to understand the expectations of the people, to move away from the state-centred approach and to draw inspiration from the lower levels of the conflict. Clearly, not all actors are or are likely to be open to dialogue. With this in mind, military responses are sometimes necessary, even if they are, in any case, insufficient on their own. Given this context, the international actors engaged in the quest for stability in the region must be sensitive to each country's local specificities

and stop making their support conditional on imported management models. It is important to respond to local needs through endogenous mechanisms.

The key points of the discussion included the need for: holistic strategies, a paradigm shift in the response to insecurity in the Sahel, the definition of a new formula for action based on protection of civilians, and dialogue conducted in an enabling environment. Current priorities could be: firstly, the rapid return to constitutional rule in Sahel-Saharan states that have experienced a coup d'état; secondly, the separation of security and political issues; and thirdly, the development of appropriate defence strategies, tailored to the realities of the countries that are to implement them, which is the subject of this panel.

Panel 04:

Experience sharing and best practices for lasting peace and stability in the Sahel and West Africa.

It emerged from the panel that in West Africa and the Sahel, women and youth have often mobilised to support key political actors in conflict resolution. In spite of a restrictive environment, they engage with other local and international social and political actors in governance, security, and resilience initiatives to respond to the situation in the Sahel and West Africa.

Innovative strategies have been developed in an attempt to tackle the crisis. The involvement of women in conflict prevention and peace initiatives across the Sahel is a key requirement for lasting peace, stability, and development in the region. These sets of good practices need to be disseminated everywhere.

A presentation was made on the activities of the ECOWAS Gender Development Centre, specifically the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF), focusing on the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) component. The WPS component was set up on the basis of the realities on the ground: discriminatory attitudes, tolerance of a culture of gender-based violence, vulnerability, failure to consider the concerns of women and vulnerable groups, poor representation of women and their concerns, and the search for appropriate and suitable solutions. The objective of the Women, Peace and Security Component is to strengthen the role played by women, particularly in conflict management, resolution, and settlement. An action plan for 2017-2020 has been adopted and implementation plans have been drawn up in all countries to better integrate women into conflict management. A beautiful experience-sharing

session served as a transition to the presentation of the G5 Sahel women's platform, which is also a multi-stakeholder structure, and a Memorandum of Understanding between the Sahel countries, which was launched in 2018 in Niamey, well before the G5-Sahel. The platform, which is represented in each G5 Sahel country, has initiated several activities and is more or less broadening its scope of action. The platform is unique in that it covers the entire Sahel, including ECOWAS countries and others. The survival of the platform in light of the current situation with political crises and coups d'état in the Sahel was a recurring question raised by the participants. The instability in the Sahel naturally impacts the platform, which must continue its actions to promote peace despite all the challenges.

The screening of a film on Peaceful Youth Resistance in Gao (Fédération des Organisations de Résistance Civile de Gao (F.O.R.C.-G)) in Mali was one of the highlights of the meeting. The film focused on the inclusion of young people and their fundamental role in peaceful civilian resistance. In Gao, despite the withdrawal of the Malian army, men and women including young people from the F.O.R.C.-G have peacefully confronted jihadist groups. Although some lost their lives, this has not been a deterrent to their peers, who have selflessly continued the struggle and pursued their commitment to ensuring peace in the region. These young people have been able to engage all stakeholders inclusively to rally to their cause of securing their region. When the community is involved, the outlines are more clearly defined and support is stronger.



With regard to peace-building experiences and mechanisms in border areas, the participants cited the example of the '*Cases de la citoyenneté*' (citizenship huts), a distinctly Senegalese initiative that should be shared and disseminated. These huts are a place of meeting and mediation for people living along the Senegalese borders, whether they are Senegalese or not.

Panel 05:

Prospects for sustainable peace in the Sahel: what inclusive responses to security instability in the Sahel and West Africa?

The panel argued that innovative mechanisms for conflict prevention and regulation should be promoted to complement the traditional mechanisms that had reached their limits. Such was the key message of this panel. The crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa is complex and multidimensional. The security situation continues to perplex observers. Institutional challenges are a permanent source of instability. Yet, despite its flaws, democracy remains the 'least worst' political system. It should therefore be adapted to the conditions in the Sahel. In this context, what should be the place of the military? Are they a road to salvation? Certainly not. Such tactics stem from a lack of republican and governance culture.

On the economic front, in addition to the food crisis, the expected post-COVID economic recovery is giving way to an energy crisis and inflation with worrisome consequences. The fight against climate change is likely to suffer, while the arms race is on the rise again. All this will have an impact on the Sahel. Hence the importance of a multi-partner and multi-dimensional approach to the Sahel and Africa. Dialogue with terrorists, if it is to take place at all, must be part of a general stabilisation approach, in support of military measures.



III. Recommendations

The conference provided an opportunity for exchanges and dialogue between experts and grassroots actors. These discussions highlighted several recommendations, including the following:

- Disband militias and self-defence groups.
- Actively listen to the people and adapt responses to their needs.
- Revisit traditional mechanisms and adapt them to current challenges.
- Recalibrate the state's regalian role in protecting the population and address the problems of the crises.
- Ensure the free movement of people and goods.
- Harmonise border management procedures.
- Involve border populations in the search for solutions and development policies.
- Define the terms of joint military cooperation to increase efficiency.
- Simplify procedures for military cooperation and joint action.
- Link the Accra initiative with other existing initiatives.
- Develop joint initiatives endogenously.
- Strengthen the strategic autonomy of the Sahel countries in the fight against terrorism and cross-border crime.
- Reaffirm the leadership of local actors and involve them in finding solutions to security challenges.
- Create a security information and intelligence centre in the Sahel-Sahara.
- Harmonise interventions by external actors.
- Boost Sahel-Saharan collaboration in the security field, particularly in the fight against violent extremism and cross-border crime.
- Provide the defence and security forces of sub-Saharan Africa with state-of-the-art equipment and appropriate training to meet the security needs of the population.
- Disseminate the experience of the F.O.R.C.-G and the 'Cases de la citoyenneté' in the Sahel-Saharan region.
- Promote inter- and intra-community dialogue.

Conclusion

The aim of this third edition of the Sahel-Sahara Dialogue was, firstly, to establish a permanent framework for dialogue between the countries of the region for better collective security; secondly, to share relevant and effective experiences of resilience in the face of insecurity; and, thirdly, to make proposals for progressive or

alternative approaches to promote inter-state cooperation with a view to fostering more lasting peace and stability in the Sahel and West Africa. One of the key recommendations was to work to ensure that such proposals reach decision-makers so that they can be translated into public policy.

