



Policy Brief

Evolution of Regional Security Outfits in Nigeria:

Ethnic or Community Policing?

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Summary

- Nigeria has for years been confronted with increasing and unfettered insecurity that seems to dampen the institutional capacity of the criminal justice system, thereby questioning the role and ability of the Nigeria Police in protecting life and property of citizens. The nation has been pushed to the extreme, stretching the response capacity of its Armed Forces, Police and other security agencies across the country to their elastic limits. Nonetheless, the Nigeria Police remains a predominant and indispensable national institution, albeit, one with its imperfections.
- Government has unwittingly allowed the responsibility for security to transfer vicariously to the citizens and state while rebuffing devolution of statutory security responsibilities by not acceding to the formation of state police. There is thus a perceived need for decentralization of Nigeria Police in tandem with dictates of federalism. Yet, efforts to restructure the Nigeria Police is still fraught with definitional, conceptual and systemic challenges.
- Justifications for restructuring the Nigeria police and devolving its authority and enforcement powers are inherent in Nigeria's federalism and the fact that the power to govern and police in Nigeria, ought to be shared between the federating units- the national and regional and state governments. While the very complex notion of policing in Nigeria is often tainted by ethnic considerations, since the federating units, the regions and states are clustered mainly but not entirely along ethnic lines, the pressure for restructuring persist.
- Moreover, ample evidence exist pointing to the fact Nigeria is likely to pursue the devolution of police powers and functions via regional security arrangements. Attractive as regional, state and community policing might be, without enabling legislation, proper funding and standardization, it would be risky to entrust policing entirely to state and local authorities. This is partly, the crux of the ongoing police restructuring debate.
- The necessary policing instruments

in Nigeria exist, but there are huge operational gaps. Often, what is lacking is the political will and faithful implementation of extant codes. The prevailing use of the Nigerian military for civilian police duties has weakened the Nigeria Police and delegitimized its statutory role, competence and capacity.

- Nonetheless, the Nigeria Police is ripe for restructuring in the context of Nigeria's federalism. By restructuring, decentralizing and devolution of Nigeria's federal police, the states are united in their quest to bring power, policing and ownership Nigeria's security architecture close to the people and grassroots. However, delays in the restructuring are traceable to peculiarities of Nigerian politics, and less so, the impediments created by consequences of federalism. Evidently, devolution of policing

cannot be anchored on ethnicity and state of origin, but on residency. Hence, devolution of police authority, power and resources must entail addressing the lingering issue of residency.

- In considering options open to Nigeria, State and Ethnic and Community policing - seem not to be the most preferred, functional or desirable options. That leaves the regional security option as the most feasible; considering that variants of it are already existent in the North-east and the South-west. Yet as desirable as the devolution of policing powers are, it will not be a one-off event, but an incremental process at different tiers of government. Interface amongst the federating units will be imperative in choosing which the option to pursue.



1. Introduction

Nigeria has for many years been confronted with increasing and unfettered insecurity that has stretched the response capacity of its Armed Forces, Police and other security agencies across the country to their elastic limits. Whereas the security threats confronting Nigeria are mostly intra-state, most now have linkages to external forces, especially non-state actors (NSAs). The physical, financial and psychological toll of insecurity on the national population, as well as loss of lives and properties, remain extremely high. The spiralling insecurity has been further compounded by the inability of the Nigeria Police to effectively combat criminality, and Nigeria's 36 States being hamstrung by constitutional dictates, relating to law enforcement.

Overwhelmed by insecurity, virulent crime wave and resulting visceral conflicts, Nigeria's geopolitical regions and states are confronted with a Catch-22 situation. The choice before them is either to respect extant constitutional dictates or seek alternative extra-constitutional policing framework. As Section 214 of the 1999

Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), states: "There shall be a Police Force in Nigeria, which shall be known as the Nigeria Police Force, and subject to the provision of this section no other Police Force shall be established for the Federation or any part thereof." Furthermore, Section 215 (2) stipulates that "The Nigeria Police Force shall be under the command of the Inspector-General of Police and contingents of the Nigeria police force stationed in a state shall, subject to the authority of the Inspector-General of Police, be under the command of the commissioner of police of that state." These provisions place policing on the Exclusive List and not on the Concurrent List, thus federalizing policing and making it the exclusive preserve of the Federal Government.

For long, it was reflexively accepted that policing reform in Nigeria could come about by sequential constitutional amendments. That, unfortunately, has not happened. Rather, the thirty-six states of Nigeria, which also comprise the six geopolitical zones, are confronted with the challenge of

accepting the unsavoury status quo; or toeing a different path that will inevitably put the States and Regions on the warpath with the Federal Government. Besides the fact that most states already maintain variants of State and Community Police units under the rubric of vigilante groups, they are setting aside partisan considerations to confront insecurity frontally. The options open to them outside a federalized police are establishing Regional Police, State Police or Ethnic or Community Police. Several regional security initiatives are already being operationalized in the South-west and North-east, while variants are contemplated in the South-east, North-central and South-south regions. The states under the aegis of geopolitical zones, seem to have opted for Regional Police, even as the constitutional basis does not exist. The decision by governours of the various regions to create regional security outfits like the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), Operation Amotekun, Shege Kafasa, Ogbunigwe, etc., as back up systems to Nigeria Police, has largely been influenced by unmet needs and capacity gaps within the federal policing structures. Clearly, the intent is not to override existing policing structures or operate independently of them. Rather, the governors envisage that such regional security arrangements would complement the efforts of the Nigeria Police and ensure safety in all the states of the regions, particularly in areas where the impact of the Nigeria Police is less felt.

Contextually, but certainly not without controversy or federal push back, the concerned regions have commenced building and operationalizing regional police super-structures with the

procurement of the patrol vans, motorbikes, communication gadgets and the recruitment of personnel. This is happening even as the constitutional basis for setting up regional security outfits and police remain unresolved and a commonly acceptable template does not yet exist. There is also no agreed enabling legislation, modalities or standardization process. For these reasons it is imperative to consider if the already operational Civilian Joint Task Force model in the North-east region could serve as the ideal template for other regions or pose new challenges? Also, since most of the thirty-six states already have various forms of vigilante groups, it has become necessary to explore if these groups could, prima facie, fulfil the needs for Ethnic or Community policing, if retrofitted for that purpose.

On 5th November 2020, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC), with co-funding from the European Union (EU), invited forty (40) multi-disciplinary personnel comprising of security sector governance reform experts, governance, policy, development and human rights experts; mediation and conflict resolution experts, academics, policymakers, serving and former police, military and civil defence officers, and civil society, non-governmental and media representatives, to a one-day brainstorming session in Abuja, Nigeria. The attendees met under the rubric of Multi-Stakeholders' Consultative Forum on Peace and Security, to interrogate the challenges of insecurity and policing in Nigeria, especially against the backdrop of the 2020 #EndSARS protests. The participants had as their Terms of Reference, the

task of brainstorming on, identifying and interrogating “Evolution of Regional Security Outfits in Nigeria: Ethnic or Community Policing?”

Several core issues relative to and subsumed within the overall topic were also addressed. These included regional security and sub-state politics in Nigeria; threats of perception, location and coherence, the interface; rights and responsibilities of citizens; lessons and engagement plan. New roles for regional security actors and localizing reforms and agenda setting were also discussed. The participants were tasked with reviewing the extant Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF)

model and to determine if it met the threshold of serving as the ideal template for evolving regional security outfits or would pose new challenges. The participants were finally tasked with developing practical policy recommendations that would form the basis of a policy brief targeted at Nigerian policymakers in the Executive and Legislative branches and the Nigeria Police. To ensure effective and unfettered discussions, the forum adopted the Chatam House rule. This policy brief is the eventual outcome of that intensive one-day multi-stakeholders' consultations.





2. Overview of Nigeria's Policing Framework

The Nigeria Police remains an indispensable national institution. Established in 1820, it is the principal law enforcement and the lead security agency in Nigeria. In 1879 the paramilitary Hausa Constabulary named the Northern Nigeria Police (NNP) was formed and in 1889, the Lagos Constabulary¹ eventually named the Southern Nigeria Police (SNP)² was established. The Nigeria Police as we know it was federalized in 1930 when the Northern and Southern regional police forces were merged.³ From its founding in 1820 to date, the mandate of the Nigeria police has essentially been to protect life and property, preserve law and order, detect and deter crimes and criminality. That mandate is presently codified in Section 215 (2) of the 1999 Constitution. Since the core function of the State is to protect its citizens, part of the Federal and State governments' responsibility to protect (R2P) Nigerian citizens, automatically devolves to the federalized Nigeria Police.

Like the Nigerian nation and people, the Nigeria Police has its strength and weaknesses. Since its founding in 1820, the Nigeria Police has strived to fulfil its statutory mandate, faced several reforms and realignment, yet it has not become the trust service institution it ought to be. Evidence abound that policing in Nigeria is not working efficaciously, even though "policing is a service to the public and law enforcement and public order maintenance (internal security) is bestowed to civilian police forces."⁴ Public dissatisfaction with the Nigeria Police is widespread as evidenced by the recent nationwide #EndSARS protests that rocked the nation. There have been several efforts to reform the Nigeria Police or realign the institution to make it more nimble and efficacious. Earliest attempts date back to "documented cases of police re-organizations, by the colonial authorities, in Lagos, as far back as 1930 and 1954."⁵ In May 1967, the Nigeria

Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) was set up to lessen the operational burden on the police and improve national security. Its mandate was subsequently amended in 2003 and 2007 via (Act No. 2 of 2003 and Act No. 6 of 4 June 2007).⁶ As former Inspector General of Police Solomon Arase noted, “No fewer than four police reforms have been undertaken by different administrations between 1999 and 2016, but none of the reforms has been implemented.”⁷

More recently, in 2017, the Nigerian Senate “pushed for the change of name from the Nigerian Police Force to simply, the Nigeria Police” thus acceding to the notion by some security sector stakeholders, “that if the word ‘force’ is removed from the Nigerian Police, it will better drive home the reality that the police is really “your friend” especially because friends don’t need force, like the military.”⁸ In September 2020, the National Assembly “passed the Police Reform Bill 2020, which was signed into law by [Nigerian] President Muhammadu Buhari on September 16, 2020.”⁹ The new law, known as the Nigeria Police Act of 2020, repeals the Police Act Cap. P19. Laws of the Federation, 2004, and provides for a more effective and well-organized Police Force, driven by the principles of transparency and accountability in its operations and management of its resources. It also addresses the challenges of structuring, appointments, promotions, discipline, postings, living conditions, pension and retirement benefits of the Nigeria Police Force.”¹⁰

In August 2020, President Muhammadu Buhari pursuant to a National Economic Council (NEC) decision, approved the sum of N13.3 billion to launch the Community Policing scheme in Nigeria.¹¹ The aim was to “rejig the security architecture in the country and deliver

a more effective policing”¹² by recruiting 10,000 constables to be deployed after training to their catchment areas. Subsequently, the incumbent Inspector General of Police, Mohammed Adamu mooted the idea of the States adopting the Community policing platform, as conceptualized, trained, overseen and funded under the auspices of the Nigeria Police in lieu of Regional or State Police. This reform effort would become a point of contention between the Police Service Commission and the Nigeria Police Management Team (See Chart 1 below); as well as with some State Governors. Despite these numerous reform efforts, the Nigeria Police is still widely derided as an unfriendly, corrupt, extortionist, and as responsible for many blatant human rights violations, including allegations of extra-judicial killings. Most of these misconducts are committed by rogue elements within the police. Yet the institutional inability to address such misconducts proactively, makes the entire police force complicit, even if only vicariously. These realities are fundamental to the push by Nigerians to de-federalize the Nigeria Police and efforts by states to put in place alternative police authorities that are in consonance with Nigeria’s federal system and devolution of powers.


Police doctrine and objectives remain unchanged

The basic doctrine and objectives of the Nigeria police have not changed radically since its inception. Rather political peculiarities have altered the ways in which the Nigeria Police have responded to its mandate. The Nigeria Police as presently constituted, remains a “very large organization,”¹³ with an estimated current staff strength of about 371,800,¹⁴ consisting of “7,300 to 7,500

police formations in Nigeria, including 17 Zonal Command Headquarters and 37 State/FCT Command Headquarters and as at 2018, there were 6,900 police formations including 128 area commands; 1,388 divisional commands, 1,579 police stations and hundreds of Police SARS and Anti-Cult formations.”¹⁵ Other units of the Nigerian police that constantly interface with the general public include the disbanded special anti-robbery squad-State (SARS/FSARS), the anti-fraud unit, the anti-cult unit, general investigation, special fraud unit, Interpol liaison, homicide, cybercrime, anti-human trafficking, counter-terrorism unit, and

anti-kidnapping squad. The ratio of the Nigeria police to the national population of 200 million, is 1:400, “which more than meets the UN’s recommended figure”¹⁶ of 1:450. However, a majority of the policemen in the Mobile Police Unit (MoPol) and the Special Protection Unit (SPU) are outsourced to foreign and domestic companies, government officials, politicians and other well-to-do VIPs.¹⁷ As a top official with privileged insider knowledge of the Nigeria Police disclosed, “we have about 400,000 personnel in Nigeria, and 200,000 of those are with the political elite.”¹⁸

Chart 1: Organogram of Nigeria Police Management Team



3. Unmet Policing Needs and Rising Insecurity Drive Quest for Restructuring

“Evolution of Regional Security Outfits in Nigeria: Ethnic or Community Policing?” the subject and focus of this policy brief, cannot be faithfully interrogated without understanding the underpinning values that drive the quest for police reform. Most Nigerians and their elected representatives no longer want the Nigeria police reformed as an institution, but gutted with its mandate, enforcement powers, material and financial resources decentralized and devolved to the federating units. Such a quest in is tandem with the general call to restructure Nigeria’s federation. The rest of this brief will render perspectives offered by the participants on the how unrealised universal policing values, failed policing, unmet policing needs, trust deficit, turf fights, absence of interface and rising insecurity, drive the quest for devolution of Nigeria police authorities and enforcement powers. Several other reasons resonate.

Globally, policing has Universal Policing Values (UPV) and standards that are not being fully met in Nigeria. First, the limitations and failings of the Nigeria Police can be attributed to its

consistently not passing the litmus test of Universal Policing Values. The general perception is that the average police officer does not exhibit professionalism, courtesy and respect to the average citizen. Despite its motto, the Nigeria Police is not deemed a friend of the public. “Rather than being associated with safety, the uniform is often seen as a source of fear and oppression, abuse and extortion.”¹⁹ As asserted by InterSociety, “The Nigeria Police Force has also been bedevilled by ‘policing industrialization’ or mercantilism and ‘terrorization’ involving hyper duplication of its various units or departments especially those in charge of violent street crimes, border crimes and transnational crimes involving: intelligence, investigation, arrest, detention and prosecution; and conversion of such units or departments into illicit money-making ventures and torture or slaughter chambers or both.”²⁰

Secondly, the efficiency of the police is no longer computed only on the basis of police to population ratios, numerics, and equipment, but increasingly on the compliance to best practices and

human rights standards. "According to United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, police per 100,000 resident population is an indicator of a nation's ability to respond and investigate civil and criminal complaints, terrorism, riots, unrest and other forms of mob or mass violence. Very high police staff may mean fewer freedoms, while too few police staff may reflect a nation's inability to afford more police."²¹ The former rather than the latter seems to be the bane of policing in Nigeria. It explains in part, why the Nigeria police is not performing as it should, and more explicitly, why there has been a clamour for restructuring or devolution of policing functions to states or geopolitical zones.

Rising criminality and institutional challenges remain hot button issues

Third, "Nigeria is undergoing very serious security and crime problems that seem to dampen the institutional capacity of the criminal justice system, thereby questioning the role and ability of the police in protecting lives and property of citizens."²² No aspect of policing failure, which includes extortion, corruption, brutality and torture, is as vexatious and damning as allegations of extra-judicial killings. The awareness that such killings happen frequently without consequences, is sufficiently compelling for most Nigerians to demand change. Civil Society Organization (CSOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) harp on such impunity and other shortcomings of the police when they press for security sector governance reform (SSG/R). Indeed, it is estimated that "Nigeria had lost

no(t) less than 140,000 citizens outside the law in the past 21 years or since June 1999. 'Killings outside the law' are killings not permissible in law or killings that ought not to have occurred, but occurred on account of failure or conspiracy of relevant State organs and their security agencies."²³

Fourth, several other factors that speak to the deep-seated dissatisfaction with the Nigeria police include rising incidences of banditry, kidnapping, cultism, police brutality, torture, extortion and broad concerns about rising impunity. The point is repeatedly made that even if the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) is publicly in denial about the inefficiencies within the Nigeria Police, its unceasing deployment of the Nigeria military to carry out purely civilian police duties is a stark testimony to prevailing Police limitations. Fifth, the challenges of policing in federalism are not peculiar to Nigeria. Nigeria belongs to a set of fifteen nations out of 200 that operate federal systems, and thus maintain different shades of the federal police. Policing in Nigeria like in different federal systems remains quite complex, even though in many instances, there are more dissimilarities than there are parallels when it comes to efforts to restructure the police and make it more efficacious, cost-effective, and above all, more accountable to the people through its compliance with best global policing and human rights standards.

As expert opinion informs, "Federalism and decentralization are the two dominant contemporary theories, which have in common to support power-sharing among multiple layers of government and protect accountability to the people..

decentralization organizes the distribution of power within a unitary or a federal polity. It provides certain institutional mechanisms for extending democratic accountability to lower ranks. For example, police can become more decentralized in unitary states by making the force accountable at the local level, even if it is of central nature.²⁴ Experts' opinion also holds that "Nigeria's federalism stipulates the devolution of power between the federating units (federal, state and local)" yet, "the centralized federal police force in Nigeria, have not been able to squarely deal with or respond to the yearnings of citizens for the security of lives and property."²⁵ Nigeria has 36 states, the Federal Capital

Territory and 774 Local Government Areas as its federating units. But for its informal nomenclature, the six geopolitical zones would equally be considered federating units. Accordingly, a federated system such as Nigeria ought to be predisposed to unfettered devolution of political as well as police powers to the federating units, the regions included. The objective, under such circumstances, is to decentralize, enhance efficacy and guarantee ownership of governance processes and needs of the federating units, security and policing, included.



4. Real and Perceived Failed Policing

Ongoing debate and efforts to enthrone Regional, State, or Ethnic and Community police is aimed at altering the status quo. Why such extreme measures? Primarily, there is a perceived need for decentralization of Nigeria Police in tandem with the principles of federalism. “The inability of the police to efficiently perform its constitutional duties, among other factors, is blamed on the over-centralization of the force in Nigeria.”²⁶ Previous efforts to address the shortcomings of the Nigeria police has resulted in both introspective and retrospective realignment of the forces, its mandate, modalities, rules of engagement, but not its jurisdiction. A Nigerian police officer being a federal officer can be posted to any part of the country. Often because police officers are routinely rotated, such crime-fighting-model does not engender familiarity, in which the officers become well known, and likewise know members of the community where they are assigned as well as the problems. This model allows the police and the community to

work jointly in solving the challenges.

Also, despite broad training regiments and exposure of Nigeria police personnel to international norms via U.N. and other international peacekeeping engagements, gross human rights violations by the Nigeria Police remains rife. It is such failings that continue to catalyze the clamour for security sector reform and especially police restructuring. In April 2020, the National Human Rights Commission announced that it had “eight documented incidents of extrajudicial killings leading to 18 deaths” between March 30 and April 13— the first two weeks of the COVID-19 related lockdown. These killings which involved military, police and the correctional services personnel,” earned Nigeria “the dubious distinction, in the world, of having more deaths by security agents than by COVID-19 at any point in the fight against COVID-19.”²⁷

Deciphering the scope of insecurity in Nigeria due to failed policing requires using some hard figures to put the challenges in perspective. “At least 1,588

have been reportedly killed in Nigeria between July to September 2020," and "the breakdown of people killed by geo-political zones includes; 638 in North-West, 544 in North-East, 194 in North Central, 93 in South-South, 70 in South-East and 49 in South-West."²⁸ These are alarming numbers. It is the real and perceived inefficiencies of a federal policing structure, which are discernibly personified by the Nigeria police that orchestrates the clamour for State Police, Ethnic or Community Police and Regional Police.

Ownership in name only and "funding without authority" not favourable to states

The ultimate paradox of the Nigeria Police is that its personnel are deployed to States, where the State Governors have the appellation of "Chief Security Officer," yet cannot direct the State Commissioner of Police on what enforcement actions to take. In actuality, the thirty-six states of the Federation, while deferring to constitutional dictates, have set up their respective State vigilante groups, while respectively underwriting the cost of logistics for the federal police personnel deployed to their territories. This reality of "funding without authority" is galling to most State authorities. In 2017, it was disclosed that "governors of the 36 states (have) collectively spent more than N2 trillion in augmenting police operations nationwide in the last decade alone."²⁹ It is also estimated that the governors of the 36 states spent some N40 billion between 2017 and 2020 for logistical support to the Nigeria Police and other security agencies in their respective States. This amount

was spent mainly on 3000 operational vehicles, numerous motorbikes, boats, armoured personal carriers and communication gadgets given to various Nigeria Police formations.

Efforts to de-federalize the Nigeria Police is not a novelty. Indeed, expert opinion contends that "Only a few countries have successfully transformed their police into service institutions...As the gap between the population's need for security and the ability of state institutions to provide it has grown, wealthier citizens have turned to the private sector. As a result, the number of private security companies has mushroomed. In Nigeria, some 1,500 to 2,000 security firms employ about 100,000 people."³⁰ This number represents the equivalent of one-quarter of current Nigeria Police strength. The prevailing reality is that "Insecurity in Nigeria will continue to trigger state responses to solving them. The reasons for these are not far-fetched. As security challenges in the country worsen, Federal and State governments seem to be seeking solutions to the new dynamics of insecurity nationwide. There seems to be much ado about the idea of regional security outfits across the geopolitical zones in Nigeria."³¹

What is perhaps problematic in undertaking such measures is that the efforts tend to be divergent instead of convergent. Such measures as already mentioned, are more remarkable for their dissimilarities and parallel tracks. The very states that seemingly oppose or are indifferent to community policing and regional security arrangements have at different times, deployed variants of community police such as


"Operation Sunlight," Operation Zaki" and "Operation Damisa" in the northern parts of Nigeria; O'dua People Congress, (OPC), and Lagos Neighbourhood Safety Corps, (LNSC), in the South-west region; Bakassi Boys in the South-east region;³² and the Egbesu Boys and the Rivers State Neighborhood Safety Corps Agency in the South-south region. Well before the States comprising the South-west region set up Amotekuen, States of the North-east geopolitical zone had set up a vigilante group called the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), now numbering some 26,000, initially to help uproot Boko Haram Islamist fighters from the city of Maiduguri and environs.

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The pervasive clamour for police reform including the insistence that "Nigeria's law enforcement and security agents should be re-oriented, through an enhanced security sector governance reforms programmes," is inextricably linked to the desire for "geopolitical-based security sector restructuring." The supporters for police reform and those who favour the creation of regional security outfits remain evenly split. Some while admitting holistic police failure, still favour restructuring of the police, stressing that "Corruption is at the root of all this. The Nigeria Police are short-staffed. We still rely on the conventional way of fighting crime. Manpower training is weak. The Police don't want to think outside the box. Modern-day technology to track crime is lacking in the Police and other security agencies."³⁴ These proponents of restructuring insist that "The way forward is to restructure the Nigeria Police force. If the Police is structured we won't need the army on our roads."³⁵

In that vein, Professor Ibrahim Gambari, prior to becoming Chief of Staff the President Buhari, "cautioned that the establishment of regional security outfits like Operation Amotekun, will cause disintegration of the country."³⁶





5. Definitional and Conceptual Challenges

Efforts to restructure the Nigeria Police is still fraught with definitional and conceptual challenges. Supporters of regional security arrangement such as Amotekun, argue that its emergence, "is a manifestation of the continued efforts of the political leaders in the South-west towards enhancing the security of lives and property which falls under the spirit of democratization and regionalization of security in Nigeria."³⁷ The argument has also been made that "existing security architecture has been overstretched by the insurgency in the North-east and other forms of criminality across the country. Those in government should be reminded that the security of life and property is the primary function of government."³⁸ Echoing such sentiments and the need for the South-east to replicate measures taken by the South-west, regional security advocates observe that "the security situation in the zone has been threatened by activities of killer herdsmen in recent times. The quest for a regional security outfit for the South-east is long overdue."³⁹

An irony in the quest for the devolution

of policing authority and powers is that while the Buhari Administration seems disinterested, the Nasir El-Rufai-led All Progressive Congress (APC) Committee on True Federalism in its report submitted in January 2018 to the Government, recommended inter-alia, that policing should be transferred from the Exclusive List to the Concurrent List, "thereby enabling the establishment of State police and clear demarcation of their responsibilities vis-à-vis the Federal (Nigerian) Police."⁴⁰ If there is a lack of national will on police restructuring arrangements, such inertia derives in the main, from lack of elite consensus in Nigeria. As rightly observed, "On one hand, the elite evinced consensus on matters that advance personal interests. On the other hand, they fragment when it comes to advancing national interest...Nigeria's national elite are polarized and clustered in discernible factions [and] have over time constituted themselves into ethno-political power blocs [that] wield considerable influence in the political scene in Nigeria, but mostly in advancing regional, sectional or ethnic interests."⁴¹

6. Justifications, Modalities and Default Choice

Beyond the existing Federal policing structures, in a democratic federation like Nigeria, citizens have the choice of selecting Regional, State, Ethnic or Community policing. Yet the ongoing resort to regional security arrangements has been more by default. “Arguably, the reluctance of the Federal government to give a nod to state police appear to have birthed the idea of the regional informal security outfits.”⁴² A notable corollary is that government has “unwittingly allowed responsibility for security to transfer vicariously to the citizens, while statutorily rebuffing such devolution of security responsibilities, by not acceding to the formation of State police. Talks about community policing were stifled even before the discussions commenced. This fact explains the emergence of informal state vigilante groups, of the Hisbah police, Islamic Security outfits, Taraba Marshalls and Joint Civilian Taskforce in northern parts of the country and eventually, in January 2020, the establishment the Western Nigeria

Security Network (WNSN) “Operation of Amotekun.”⁴³ Interestingly, the Federal government had reacted adversarially to Amotekun, which “Attorney-general of the Federation (AGF) Abubakar Malami, characterized as illegal.”⁴⁴ While the “push back from some quarters resulted in each south-western state adopting the outfit individually, the truth remains that they share the same template and collaborate extensively.”⁴⁵ It is instructive that “Far from evaluating the utility and efficacy of Amotekun, the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) in a kneejerk reaction declared that “The setting up of the paramilitary organization called “Amotekun” is illegal and runs contrary to the provisions of the Nigerian law.”⁴⁶ That disposition notwithstanding, “Other regions are now toeing the South-west line.”⁴⁷

As observed, “The Federal Government’s singular reaction to Amotekun was reflective of a leadership and nation in deep denial

and how obfuscation is utilized to truncate transformative public policies."⁴⁸ This contention is aptly supported by Olusegun Adeniyi, who rightly observed, "to hand down an order from Abuja as Malami did, is counter-productive, especially when he also appears to be speaking not for Nigeria, but rather for some special interest groups, in a manner that fatally threatens the unity of the country as an inclusive polity founded on diversity."⁴⁹ It is a matter of fact that "all the northern state governors used to meet and take decisions on security; they (also) have vigilantes."⁵⁰ As Ondo State Governor Rotimi Akeredolu reiterated while signing the Security Network and Amotekun Corps Bill into law on 4 March 2020, "the Amotekun Corps is a child of necessity and was purely borne out of the need to explore other means of securing our forests and protecting all those who do legitimate business within the South-west."⁵¹ Consequent upon the successful setting up of the CJTF in the North-east and Amotekun in the South-west, regional security outfits now seem inevitable across the rest of the federation.

Meanwhile, various justifications for de-federalizing the Nigeria police subsist. Numerous arguments can be advanced to justify a resort to regional security outfits in Nigeria. Most are credible and therefore not farfetched. Primary among these is that the existing arrangements are not working optimally. Even though the three predominant security crises in Nigeria -militancy in the Niger Delta, Herdsmen-Farmers Conflict, and Boko Haram – do not lend themselves to classical civilian policing, they are situated in different regions just as they have different root causes. Hence, while the push for Ethnic or

Community, State or Regional policing aims at operationalizing indigenous informal models of policing; the ultimate goal is ownership and better accountability.

Basis for restructuring Nigeria police are inherent in tenets of federalism

Justifications for restructuring the Nigeria police and devolving its authority and enforcement powers are also inherent in the fact that as a federation, the power to govern and police in Nigeria, ought to be shared between national and regional and state governments. That, unfortunately, is not presently the case. A key component of the demands and justifications to restructure Nigeria is the need to tweak the security architecture, along with power and resource sharing. The need for this is twofold; rising insecurity, and the fact that the States and individuals routinely end up underwriting security expenses, despite the huge resources devoted to the police and other security agencies. Whereas the States do not have independent police, it is commonly known and accepted that "state governments that did not have constitutional roles in public policing, had to step in to salvage public policing in the country by providing funding and other logistical supports to the Nigerian Police Force."⁵² Whether Nigeria will shift away from federalized policing is no longer a matter of if, but of when, and by which methodology. The October 2020 "#EndSARS protests succeeded in bringing the issue of the reform of the Nigeria police to focus."⁵³ Hence, the restructuring is well underway and will be further bolstered by whatever policy responses the FGN accord to

the five-point #EndSARS protests demands. Ultimately, it will all boil down to choices, possible consensus and what justifications and modalities carry the day.

The arising question is this: Why can't regions and states in a federalized Nigeria have their own police? The requisite answer may lie in understanding and accepting that the very complex notion of policing in Nigeria is further coloured and affected by ethnic considerations, since the federating units, the regions and states are clustered mainly but not entirely along ethnic lines. Nearly all 36 states have one form of quasi-police or vigilante groups. The raging debate is not if there is need for ethnic, state, regional or other ancillary forms of policing; but how such structures once are chosen, could be effectively operationalized without jeopardy to national cohesion and national security. This has been a core focus of advocating entities dealing with security sector reform (SSR) and security sector governance (SSG). The crux of whether the status quo should be retained or alternatively, yield to state demands, continue to rest on two pedestals. "While the federal government has insisted that Nigeria is not ripe for multiple police forces, the position taken by State governments is that the solution to security problem of Nigeria is an amendment to the constitution to permit the States to own their own forces."⁵⁴ The latter position, while seemingly popular, is hamstrung by widely expressed fears among the national intelligentsia, that state governors would use State police to persecute their political opponents and oppress

non-indigenes. These assertions find validity in the wide abuse in the use of the native constabulary - the Dogaris, in the North, the Ilaris and Olokpas in the South-west, and the Police-Eliza in the South-east - in the post-colonial period.



Civilian Joint Task Force (Above) and Amotekun personnel (Below)

The Federal Government for its part has proffered Community Policing, which is in tandem with extant constitutional dictates to the States. The idea and proposal were quickly shut down by some southern governors, who underlined that their notion of Community Policing is one wherein the leadership, command, control, coordination and communication of the force, resides fully with the State or Community authorities. Explicitly, they insisted that for community policing proposed by the Federal Government to work, those incharge of community police structures must be indigenes since "they the terrain better than any other police officers who are not indigenes."⁵⁵ Their position is in tandem with the emphasis on "homegrown security

arrangements.”⁵⁶ It further underpins the contention that “The current concept of ‘police’ in Nigeria is a colonial import. It reflects a Western legalistic definition of crime. Traditional societies in Nigeria tend to have a more nuanced view, with an emphasis on the context of the alleged crime or the dispute. Rather than a police force, traditional villages often had watchmen.”⁵⁷ However, the flip side to this rationalization is that such regionalisation of the police tends to highlight the nation’s desegregation rather than its integration. Given the security challenges confronting Nigeria, it has been observed that she might be “moving toward the American practice of state and local police, with only the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) being an arm of the federal government. If that is the intent, Nigeria has a long way to go. The national police service remains a powerful, if hated, interest. It also remains to be seen if ethnic and religious favouritism surfaces among locally-based law enforcement units.”⁵⁸

Full implementation of residency provisions in the constitution fundamental to restructuring

In evaluating the available facts, advocacies and trends relative to restructuring and devolution of the Nigeria Police, there is ample evidence pointing to the fact Nigeria might be wittingly or unwittingly disposed to pursuing the devolution of police powers and functions via regional security arrangements. Such perception does not diminish the positive values assigned to either State Police or Community policing. Despite persisting concerns that State Police

might be abused “Proponents of state police recommends that, the existing arrangement of deploying the bulk of the police to their indigenous states should be made constitutional. Second, both state and federal laws should be enforced. Third, structures of checks and balances which insulate the police from partisan politics and control by political officer holders should be put in place. But above all, the current skewed federal arrangement should be restructured with power, resources and responsibilities duly devolved to the state and local levels”⁵⁹ However, those who oppose State police are adamant, and with valid reasons. The upshot as Mohammed Abubakar, a former Inspector-General of Police had stressed, “The country is not yet ripe for it” and won’t be “until the residency law becomes applicable.”⁶⁰

There are also values that support Community Policing, which are conceived to “Provide an atmosphere in which the police and law-abiding citizens can work in partnership to: solve problems; share resources; prevent crime; promote inter-agency collaboration; bring offenders to justice; reduce conflict, and improve the overall quality of community life.”⁶¹ The point made by Ogbonna Onovo, former Inspector General of Police, remains pertinent: “Community Policing – recognizes that the police alone do not have the necessary proactive or reactive capability and capacity to meet the challenge. Thus multi-agency and community collaboration – through partnerships – become imperative.”⁶²

Ultimately, regional policing which Nigeria is tending towards seems more of an interim and transitional arrangement to state police. For

now, there is a clear precedent in Amotokuen. Secondly, despite the character and nomenclature of the Civilian Joint Task Force, State and Community or Ethnic police at this point seems unlikely due to their unwieldiness and extremely weak local and municipal governance infrastructures, which may subject them political, ethnic, or religious manipulation. It is noteworthy that Nigeria's major cities have no elected Mayors or elected City Managers. The 774 Local Governments are dominated not by elected officials, but by cronies appointed by State Governors. Therein lies a core premise militating against Community Policing.

It was against the foregoing backdrop that participants in the multi-stakeholder forum were tasked to interrogate the facts and options, analyse the peculiarities of policing in Nigeria, and juxtapose it with policing experience in other federalisms, as well as international best practices, and thereafter, "identify the implications of a shift to federalism when it comes to the policing forces" and make policy recommendations that will assist "policymakers to make the right decision when designing their police system."⁶³



7. Key Takeaways Emanating from the Policing Discourse

In discussing policing in Nigeria, the forum participants tackled some contending issues, focusing on overarching concerns, which include the absence of true federalization of the Nigerian police, limited ownership of the policing processes by the federating units, absence of synergy and complementarities in security and law enforcement between the federal and state authorities, and the deep-seated distrust gap between the police and the national population. Participant took cognisance that some ambiguity remains in defining Community policing. Is it the federal police acting alone at the community level, or does it represent a scenario, wherein the locals, the police and other security agencies work in concert in policing communities? Some considered Community policing, a matter of methodology and policing style akin to Neighbourhood Policing. Both policing models involve community vigilante groups, not just the Federal police being immersed in communities. Nevertheless, this definitional dichotomy has made community policing not very receptive

to the States, which want unfettered recruitment, ownership and command, control and coordination of such police forces.

It was attested that while the essence of policing is providing security and the protection of the people, most Nigerians struggle to see the Nigerian citizen in existing policing structures. Policing structures needed to be strengthened. Since the Police are less responsive to citizens, there is a need to know why and what can be done to effectively address the challenges. Police officers are first and foremost Nigerian citizens, thus the challenges confronting them is a determinant of their ability to effectively carry out their mandate. Poor or non-existent police facilities and welfare "has a way of affecting the psyche of the average policeman/woman that is also expected to put in his best in securing people living decently in clean and habitable neighbourhoods."⁶⁴ If the task of the policing was to guarantee the protection of lives and properties, the question was raised as to "Who are the citizens that the federal police are

policing?" It was thus suggested that police reform must be undertaken in tandem with addressing the question of Nigerian citizenship and residency rights. Presently a systemic dysfunction made such reform impossible. It was recognized that globally, police reform in federalism takes time; is not ever easy and is often contentious. That reality was also true of Nigeria. One question that was repeatedly asked was "How does Nigeria Police become effective?" The commonality of response was encapsulated by the expression of the need for "strategic representation" and "effective restructuring aimed at ownership and inclusivity." Police reform is adjudged as good, and the 2020 #EndSARS protests considered positive as it was aimed at police reform and ensuring collective responsibility in policing.

National security architecture exists more in letter than in spirit

Participants interrogated whether Nigeria had a security architecture. The house was split. But it was underlined that a national security architecture did exist, insofar as the 1999 Constitution, the National Security Strategy, National Defence Strategy, Police Act and Police Orders, and the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 were in place. It was thus agreed that whereas the necessary policing instruments did exist, there were huge operational gaps. In a nutshell, national security architecture existed more in the letter than in the spirit of its purpose. Often, what was lacking was the political will and faithful implementation of extant codes. Turf fights also undermined

policing. An example was given of how the Police Service Commission and the Police Management Team differed on the recruitment of 10,000 new police constables. It was also observed that the National Security Strategy of 2020, did not evaluate the performance threshold and implementation of the 2014 National Security Strategy. That being the case, the continuity-in-governance (CiG) of policing was disjointed. What was perhaps more egregious, was that the Nigeria Police Council (NPC) has been moribund. The functions of that statutory body, which is supposed to be chaired by the President with all State Governors, the Minister of Interior and the Inspector General of Police as members, has been usurped by the National Economic Council (NEC), the Police Service Commission and other federal entities. It amounted to misplaced priority and functions for the NEC to review and make decisions on policing rather than focusing on economic issues.

Participants worried about inherent dangers inferred by the proposals to regionalise the Nigeria Police. They argued that the federal police was sufficiently devolved with the May 2020 creation of 17 zonal police commands. Police reform required tackling the existing trust deficit, the states being compelled to fund the police within their respective jurisdictions, without having requisite command and enforcement authority; and existing turf fights within federal security agencies. Some participants argued that attractive as regional, state and community policing might be, without enabling legislation, proper funding and standardization, it would be too risky to entrust policing entirely to state and local authorities.


Some felt that Nigeria Police receiving its statutory budgetary allocations and still collecting financial logistical support from States amounted to "double-dipping." Such "Funding without authority" remained for most State authorities, a vexatious, contentious and unacceptable situation. Other perceived challenges, included how to insulate regional policing from the influence of the political class, how to tackle proliferating non-state actors and a slew of ungoverned spaces bedevilling Nigeria.

Participants traced "policing failure" to inadequate funding, deplorable welfare and service conditions and the best brains not being recruited into the police due to cronyism and nepotism. It was suggested that the so-called

State Security votes, estimated at N241 billion⁶⁵ annually, should be abolished and the resources appropriated and channelled to effective policing. Some participants stressed vehemently, that devolution of police authority, powers and resources was not possible without first addressing the issue of residency. They were strident of the view that true devolution of policing cannot be anchored on ethnicity and state of origin but residency. The participants rallied to a consensus that any policing reform aimed at devolution has to be holistic. Since States presently legislate and adjudicate, they ought to be able to also enforce; and that includes running their criminal procedure, penal systems and prison infrastructure. Participants also agreed that human and financial resources presently devoted to the

Table 1: Devolution of 2020 Nigeria Police Human Resources by apportionment

Extant Federal Police Strenght	372,000	100%
Prorated Federal Police (+FCT) Strenght	75,000	20%
Prorated Regional Police Strenght	297,000	80%



Nigerian Police (see Table 1) will need to devolve to the regions and states.

It was broadly accepted that the disconnect between federal and state authorities on policing matters, were indicative of the absence of proper and sustainable interface. Often such limitations arise mainly from the absence of clear delineation of jurisdiction, overlapping mandates, the inclination to supremacy or superiority complex and turf fights. Regardless of what type of policing Nigeria eventually choose, the nation will still rely on the federal police for standardization, since at some point, community, regional and federal police must interface seamlessly in order to be effective. Whereas "Hybridism" of the police force could be an asset, it would be vitally important while restructuring, to designate which security agencies should handle what security challenges. In this context, it was felt that the police needed to be proactive in driving the much-needed

change.

Finally, the point was made repeatedly that the use of the Nigerian military for strictly civilian police duties was indicative of a problem, it was also the cause of some existing problems. Not only has the use of the Nigerian military for civilian police duties militarized and weaponized policing, but it has also weakened the Nigeria Police deeply, and delegitimized its statutory role and capacity. It also created new threats and challenges as the military is accustomed to the use of force and not well tutored in the police crisis and conflict de-escalation methods. Often, police personnel are bullied by the military. Since the rules of engagement for the military were vastly different from that of the police, unnecessary conflicts and civilian casualties resulted during military policing interventions as was the case with the Lekki Toll Gate shooting saga of 20th October 2020.





8. Possible Scenarios of Emergent Devolution Structures

Nigeria is not the only nation confronted with the pressing need to restructure its police. The first critical measure is to understand the policing options open to Nigeria's federating units. Four scenarios are deemed applicable:

- The existing Federal Police covering the entire nation;
- Regional Police, which will apply to Nigeria's six geopolitical zones;
- State Police, which will have jurisdiction and its areas of operation in the 36 States and Abuja;
- Ethnic or Community/County police, which could be structured along with the existing 774 local government counties or in smaller subsets of the thousands of Towns, Municipalities, and Villages that make up Nigeria.

The argument against Ethnic or Community police is dual-tracked: the lack of resources and infrastructural capacity; and the fact that it might promote visceral ethnic or religious bias or become politicized. Community Police formations might be handicapped in handling non-state actors and contiguous ungoverned

spaces. Relatedly, the point was made that the six geo-political regions are not all clustered along ethnic or linguistic lines. From available evidence and research, restructuring a federalized police like Nigeria effectively requires assessing the variables at play and indeed, responding to a checklist⁶⁶ and four critical sets of questions:

- What is the desired distribution of police competences?
- What are the policing powers given to each force?
- How centralized should the organization of daily policing forces be?
- In the event of opting for regional, state or lower-level forces, what law (national enabling legislation), recruitment, management, training, penal code, criminal procedure code and information systems should apply?

Regardless of which policing option Nigeria chooses in the end, each policing framework is geared to the common and general purpose of keeping of law and order, even as

competence and responsibilities will be determined by jurisdiction and areas of operation. Again, regardless of which model is selected, it is clear that it is only the entity designated as the federal police that will have authority across state boundaries and nationwide. This reality inevitably raises the issue of competence, capacity, standardization and enabling legislation. Cost-sharing also remains a critical issue since the cost of running the federalized Nigeria police remains enormous, rising from an estimated operating budget of N380 million in 1984 to N521 million in 1988.⁶⁷

Today, the Nigeria Police operating budget estimates, are pegged at N447.6 billion, that being the amount allocated in the 2021 Appropriation Bill.⁶⁸ If there is decentralization, retrenchment and redeployment of federal police officers to their regions of origin, then these operational costs, will inevitably devolve to the regions and states. (See Table 2) Naturally, the devil will be in the cost-sharing details.

Table 2: Devolution of 2021 Nigeria Police Appropriated Budgetary Resources by apportionment Budget Estimates for FY 2021 NGN 448 billion

Entities	Percentage	Amount in NGN
Federal Police Estimates	100%	448 billion
Prorated Federal Police (+FCT)	20%	89.6 billion
Six (6) Geopolitical Zones (Region) Estimates	80%	358.4 billion
Thirty-Six (36) States Estimates	80%	358.4 billion

Remark: Each region will get approximately NGN 60 bn & each States will get approximates NGN 10 bn p.a.



9. Conclusion

Restructuring the Nigeria Police in the context of Nigeria's federalism is long overdue. The vehemence of the public clamour for such restructuring is evidence that the reform is most desirable. That fact is further underpinned by the strident debate as to which form of policing is most suitable for the Nigerian federation. However, the delays in the restructuring are largely traceable to peculiarities of Nigerian politics, and less so, the impediments created by the consequences of federalism. The paradox of strict federalization of the national police force is that despite Nigeria's federalism – with its distinct federating unit- States, makes laws and adjudicate; but enforcement is carried out by transient federal police personnel, whom often, are non-indigenes and non-residents of the legislating State.

Unfortunately, as desirable as the devolution of policing powers is, it will not be a one-off event, orchestrated for instance, by a single bill or constitutional amendment, but an evolutionary and incremental process undertaken at different times in different tiers of government. This

much can however be said; despite reservations and concerns in some quarters, Nigeria is ripe for a restructuring of the federal police. However, of the options open to her, Ethnic and Community policing are presently not the most preferred options nor the most functional or desirable. That leaves the regional security option as the most feasible, considering that variants of it are already existent in the North-east and in the South-west. Nevertheless, there will continue to be challenges since "regional security outfits will only achieve its objective of addressing inherent security issues in the regions establishing them if only state governments commit to due diligence, strict accountability and transparency measures."⁶⁹ Therefore, in seeking to de-federalize and decentralize the Nigeria police, it is worth understanding what State and Regions are seeking to achieve.

The 36 states are united in their quest to bring policing to the grassroots

Existing policy and research materials

provide evidence that in seeking the restructuring, decentralizing and devolution of the Nigeria Police, Nigeria's 36 states are united as federating units in their quest to:

- Bring the power, ownership of Nigeria's security architecture and policing close to the people at the grassroots; and guarantee local content, language, cultural values and norms that are locally understood and respected, thus avoiding bias and accusations of tribalism;
- Promote courtesy, professionalism and respect by the police for the citizen and taxpayer;
- Engender better appreciation or perception that human rights and ordered liberties are unambiguously respected and not violated;
- Enhance human intelligence and deterrence as police officers recruited from within the community or catchment areas, tend to know their community members, their antecedents and history better;
- Ensure greater efficacy in legislating penal codes; state legislatures ought to respectively have exclusive power to legislate laws regulating

enforcement, the police force and its functioning;

- Ensure clear determination of what constitutes a federal crime, state crime and violations pertaining to local ordinances;
- Facilitate the placement and proximity of police to the society/grassroots in ways that ensure their full immersion into their areas of operation and jurisdiction, which in turn, creates higher deterrence by placing the police in a more proactive position to detect and mitigate crime before it festers; and finally,
- Ensure that the burden of the costs of underwriting national security is equitably shared between the Federal and State governments.

The foregoing are selling points the various regions and States need to continue canvassing proactively. Accordingly, for regions and States exploring de-federalization of the Nigeria police, policymakers and legislators at all levels, may wish to take into account the following thirteen-point recommendations in the process of choosing, which policing framework to adopt across-board.



10. Recommendations

Choice of policing framework

1. Push for the decoupling of policing from the Exclusive List and transferring it to the Concurrent List, with clear delineation of the role of regional security outfits, its relations with federal policing authorities, and its rules of engagement. The goal here is to establish a common interface and operational standard (nomenclature & ranking) in the federation, as well as jurisdictions, and clearly determining circumstances in which federal law enforcement authority will supersede or override those of regional and state policing authorities;
2. Push to implement fully the Residency provision of the Constitution and make it applicable and mandatory in employing federal, regional or state police officers.
3. Reach an agreement on the component strength of the remnant federal police (the equivalent of the FBI in the U.S.) and modalities for transferring the services of the present police officers to their regions of origin and sharing the cost of their services and emoluments and benefits.
4. Consolidate, retrain and integrate existing vigilante groups and other quasi-security organisations into new regional security structures. Inevitably, some members will need to be demobilized and reintegrated into society;
5. Ensure universal accountability, by ensuring that the regional security outfits are backed by uniform enabling State legislation; and that funding resources, weapons, logistics, and ancillary policing accoutrement and administrative standards are equally uninformed within geopolitical zones;
6. Consider shifting away from the colonial practise of quartering police officers in barracks and away from communities in which they operate. Only Specialized and Strategic (SAS)

crisis response police contingents should be quartered to facilitate mobility and rapid deployment.

7. Seek to codify unambiguous guarantee of human rights in rules of engagement and operational mandates of their regional police forces; and
8. Sign off on agreed modalities for command, coordination and control and basic capacity and resources required to project force in complex emergencies or crises; and during exigencies, the parameters for stand-alone federal enforcement.

Transformative legislative and systemic measures

9. Ensure that the Nigeria Police Council (NPC) should carry out its statutory functions unimpeded, along with the Police Service Commission (PSC) and the Minister of Interior.

10. National Assembly should legislate the scraping of security votes. Otherwise, it should be subjected to the same oversight as very other appropriated vote.

11. National Assembly should proscribe the use of the military for civilian police duties.

12. Pursuant to Section 33 (2) of the 1999 Constitution Nigeria Police should maintain a well trained, well-sensitized and well-equipped specialized rapid response unit that can be deployed instead of the military for the purpose of suppression of riot, insurrection or mutiny.


13. All police training doctrine and manuals must highlight and emphasise that the Nigerian police in its everyday conduct and activities are bound by section 33 (1) the 1999 Constitution which provides for the right to life as one of the fundamental rights of every Nigerian citizen.



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