Since the coup d’état in Mali in March 2011 it seems that the International Community has recognized the importance of a region that was left alone to its own fate for the most part in the past. High structural underdevelopment and huge areas of lawless desert mark a region that now has become a safe haven for terrorist activities and organised crime. Despite the fact that the International Community is exerting pressure towards a solution, a closer look into prior engagements reveal that conflict resolution by international actors are often grounded on short-term considerations and own interests. A merely military reaction to the problem in northern Mali will most likely not lead to a lasting peace in the region. That is why FES organised this Abuja Dialogue that was hold in the National Defence College (NDC) between the 20th and 22nd November in Abuja, Nigeria, in order to take a closer look at long-term perspectives and the underlying causes of insecurity in the region.
Generating a civil society perspective on security in the Sahel
‘International co-operation is far too important to be left to governments alone’, once stated by the first Social Democratic German Chancellor, Williy Brandt, and still the main driving force of FES’ international work today. Against this background the Abuja Dialogue ‘The Sahel in Upheaval: Long-Term Perspectives on Security in North and West Africa’ was organised to create a platform for civil society actors from the region in order to exchange views on the matter. For that reason about thirty experts and practitioners from academia and relevant working areas from North and West Africa as well as Europe were invited to take part in the method of scenario building.
The aim of the technique of scenario building is to create a visual system of influential factors for the next 20 years. Scenarios are defined as plausible futures that are generated on the basis of analysis of the present conditions. The approach was realised into three phases: firstly, all relevant key factors that cause insecurity in the region were identified. In the second step the relations of the key factors to each other were qualified. Lastly, possible future developments of every key factor were analysed both in a negative as well as positive way. In order to assure an appropriate application of the methodology, Björn Kulp who is specialised in scenario technique was invited to moderate the three-day conference.
Key factors of insecurity in the region
Promptly it came apparent that Mr. Kulp and the moderators of the four working groups will have no easy task to guide the discussions. The participants were really energetic and their profound knowledge in the area of security made it at times hard to compromise on key factor and its exact description. However in the end they agreed on a catalog of nine key factors that were identified as main sources of insecurity in the Sahel region.
Transnational Organised Crime (TOC) constitutes one crucial cause of insecurity. This category covers criminal activities like money laundry, arms, drugs and human trafficking etc… Political governance is depicted as second key factor and can be described as political leadership, the inability to deliver just electoral processes and educational services as well as poor conflict management. Social-economic conflicts and terrorism were established as another central aspect of insecurity. Apart from that, influences from external and extra-regional powers and the consequences of globalisation were subsumed under the heading of geopolitical contest. Environmental challenges as well as the demography factor especially concerning the youth bulge are other threads to social peace in the Sahel region. Complementary to that, the experts of the conference see energy and other natural resources as a driving force on its own that has a conflict potential and can thus affect power relations and policies. Historical legacies like colonialism and weak institutions and capacity are illustrate as two other key factors of insecurity. And last but not least the ‘chronic illness’ of the region – corruption – was set as a source of insecurity on its own.
Fire fighting instead of fire prevention
During the intensive working days a lot of opinions were exchanged among the experts. For example it became apparent that African conflict resolution is more reactive than proactive which was especially criticised by the practitioners. They saw the lack of conflict management as a source of insecurity that can cause problems in the long-term. However in the end the majority decided to subsume the aspect of conflict resolution as part of political governance. But in addition, political governance was a major point of discussion. For instance, the experts discussed if leadership is a factor on its own or whether it does belong to political governance? Or, is it more adequately to say only governance so that private actors can be made comprehensible?
Historical legacies constituted another key factor that engaged the experts in long discussion. The question was whether or not the past is a causal variable of insecurity and poor governance in the region. For those who were in favour of historical legacies as key factor the main reason for Bad Governance in most African state were the colonial powers that created those states in the post-colonial period of the 1960s . As a consequence of the past, state institutions are not serving the people as they were excluded of the creation process. Others were more of the opinion that it is the African societies that have to become aware of their obligations as citizens. No colonial heritage can explain why free people allow authoritarian leaders to rule their societies. This argument suggests a more “practical” approach to the past and wants to overcome victimhood in order to become more proactive towards the present and the future.
Developing visions for the region
The raw scenarios, built upon the key factors made one aspect very clear: North and West Africa have a lot of potential that can be converted into positive but also into negative development. For example the demographic factor of high rate of youthful population. When there is access for education, health and employment this factor can be transformed into a productive force that can lead to industrialisation and wealth in the future. But when the situation will not alter or even deteriorate then it is very likely that crime rates increase thus creating fertile soils for terrorism and youth gangs to flourish and establish spaces of anarchy.
In the end of the Abuja Dialogue not only the organisers but also the participants were satisfied with the findings of the conference. FES pronounced her commitment to continue the process and rarefy the plausible future scenarios in order to get a better and more detailed idea how the future can look like in 20 years in the Sahel, both in a negative but also in a positive way. Therefore all participants were invited to join the process in the year 2013.
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